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THE RETROACTIVITY OF MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
PERSONAL INJURY DECISIONS
When a court overrules substantive case law, it must decide whether to appl(y the
new rule of law retroactlively orprospertt'l. This judicial determination has a
substantialimpact on htigants whose cause ofaction aroseprior to the date of the
overruling decision but whose case comes to trialafter th? date of the overruling
decision. In the areas ofproperty, contract,and criminallaw, Minnesota hasfollowed the majority rule ofprospective overruhng. In the area of tort law, however,
Ainnesota recenty has departedfrom the majority view that substantive tort law
shouldbe overruled only retroactiveoy. This Note examines the policies underling
prospective and retroactive overruhng in the personalinjury setting and traces the
Minnesota Supreme Court decisions leading to the adoption ofprospectve overruling ofsubstantve tort law in Minnesota.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past twenty years, tort law has undergone dramatic reform.' A
1. See REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA CITIZENS COMMISSION ON TORT REFORM,
RIGHTING THE LIABILITY BALANCE 4 (1977); Henderson, Expanding the Neghgence Concept.
Retreat From the Rule ofLaw, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 468 (1976). But see Pedrick, Does Tort Law
Have a Future?,39 OHIO ST. L.J. 782, 783-84 (1978). In this era of tort reform, Minnesota
has emerged as one of the leaders in the advancement of tort law. Minnesota's first tort
reform decision occurred in 1920 when the court abolished charitable immunity. See Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 398, 175 N.W. 699, 701 (1920).
In the past twenty years, the Minnesota Supreme Court has been extremely active in the
reform of tort law. For example, the court has abolished sovereign immunity, see Nieting
v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 132, 235 N.W.2d 597, 603 (1975); Spanel v. Mounds View
School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 292, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (1962), abrogated parentchild immunity, see Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968);
Balts v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419,433, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (1966), eliminated for the purpose of
automobile accidents the doctrine that imputes the negligence of a servant to a master so
as to bar a third-party suit by the master, see Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 274
Minn. 482, 491, 144 N.W.2d 540, 545 (1966), applied strict liability in products liability
cases, see McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 339-40, 154 N.W.2d 488, 501
(1967), allowed a wife to recover for her loss of consortium, see Thill v. Modern Erecting
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necessary result of this reform has been the judicial overruling of prior
decisions. 2 When a court changes substantive rules of law by overruling
previous case law, the court must decide when the new rules of law will
become effective. The law of a particular case may be applied either
prospectively or retroactively.3 Retroactive overruling means that a new
rule of law is applied to the case before the court and to all cases that
reach final adjudication after the date of the overruling decision. 4 When
Co., 284 Minn. 508, 513, 170 N.W.2d 865, 869 (1969), abrogated interspousal immunity,
see Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 371-73, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969), merged assumption of the risk in the secondary sense with contributory negligence, see Springrose v.
Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971), abolished the legal status of
property entrants as the determinative factor for the liability of property owners, see Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 164, 199 N.W.2d 639, 642 (1972), allowed a manufacturer
to obtain indemnity from an installer who failed to discover the defect in the manufacturer's product, see Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68 (Minn. 1977),
ruled that a third party can obtain limited contribution from a negligent employer under
the Minnesota workers' compensation statute, see Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312
Minn. 114, 128-30, 257 N.W.2d 679, 689 (1977), recognized a cause of action from wrongful conception, see Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1977), discussed in Comment, Wrongful Conception, 5 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 464 (1979), held that a
strictly liable manufacturer can obtain contribution from a negligent cotortfeasor and that
contributory negligence can be compared with the strict liability of a cotortfeasor under
the Minnesota comparative negligence statute, see Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262
N.W.2d 377, 393 (Minn. 1977), noted in 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 517 (1979), and
adopted the doctrine of informed consent in medical malpractice cases. See Cornfeldt v.
Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 699 (Minn. 1977).
2. See, e.g., note I supra.
3. For an excellent overview of prospective and retroactive overruling, see Rogers,
Perspectiveson Prospective Overruling, 36 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 35 (1968); Traynor, Quo
Vadis, Prospective Overruling. A Question of Judicial Responsiblity, 28 HASTINGs L.J. 533
(1977). See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142-49 (1921);
Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law. Prospective Overruhng, 51 VA. L. REV. 201
(1965); Friedland, Prospective and RetrospectiveJudicialLawmaking, 24 U. TORONTO L.J. 170
(1974); Friedmann, Limits ofJudicialLawmaking and Prospective Overruling, 29 MOD. L. REV.
593 (1966); Haddad, "Retroactivity Should be Rethought': A Callfor the End of the Linkletter
Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 417 (1969); Hasler, Retroactivity Rethought. The Hidden
Costs, 24 MAINE L. REv. 1 (1972); Levy, RealistJuriprudenceand Prospective Overruling, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1960); Mishkin, Foreword- The High Court, The Great Wnt, and the Due
Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56 (1965); Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts"
Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631 (1967); Schwartz, Retroactivity,
Reliability, and Due Process. A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (1966);
Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REv. 121 (1940); Note, Prospective-Prospective Overruling, 51 MINN. L. REV. 79 (1966).
4. In Shepherd v. Consumers Coop. Ass'n, 384 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1964), the court
stated, "we have, in overruling such former cases, applied the correct rule in the case in
which it is announced, and in doing so made it retroactive in effect, and have thereafter
applied the correct rule in all cases coming before us." Id at 640 (quoting Koebel v.
Tiemen Coal & Material Co., 337 Mo. 561, 571, 85 S.W.2d 519, 524 (1935)).
Pure retroactive overruling treats the new rule of law as if it never existed. Therefore
it allows parties to appeal judgments based solely upon the new rule of law. See generally
Snyder, supra note 3; Note, Limited Retroactivity of Overruling Decisions: A Doctrine ofJustice, 25
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a decision is prospectively overruled, application of the new rule of law is
limited to the case before the court and to causes of action arising after
the date of the decision. 5
Obviously, the choice between prospective and retroactive overruling
has a significant impact on future litigation. If a decision is prospectively
overruled, causes of action arising prior to the date of the overruling decision that come to trial after the date of the overruling decision will not be
judged under the new rule of law.6 In contrast, if a decision is retroactively overruled, all cases decided after the overruling decision will be
tried under the new rule of law. 7 Therefore, an examination of the policies underlying prospective and retroactive overruling is necessary to understand the circumstances under which either theory may properly be
applied.
This Note will examine the policies underlying prospective and retroactive overruling and discuss how these policies affect the choice between
the two approaches. 8 In particular, this Note will focus on the decisions
of the Minnesota Supreme Court that have overruled substantive tort
law. 9 In addition, Minnesota's approach to prospective and retroactive
VA. L. REV. 210 (1938). For a severe criticism of pure retroactive overruling, see Snyder,
supra; Note, supra. Because no modern jurisdiction uses pure retroactive overruling, see
note 25 in7fta, for the purposes of this Note retroactive overruling shall mean that the new
rule of law is applied to the case before the court and to cases coming to trial or in judicial
process at the date of the overruling decision.
In Minnesota the term "retroactive" is synonymous with the term "retrospective."
For cases using the term "retrospective," see, e.g., B.F. Griebenow, Inc. v. Anderson, 287
Minn. 174, 177, 177 N.W.2d 395, 397 (1970); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 431, 142
N.W.2d 66, 74 (1966). For cases using the term "retroactive," see, e.g., Peterson v. Balach,
294 Minn. 161, 173, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Firemen's Fund American, 290 Minn. 504, 505, 186 N.W.2d 534, 535 (1971); Schultz v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 286 Minn. 231, 239, 175 N.W.2d 177, 181-82 (1970). For the purposes of this Note, the term "retroactive" will be used throughout to refer to both "retroactive" and "retrospective."
5. In B.F. Griebenow, Inc. v. Anderson, 287 Minn. 174, 177 N.W.2d 395 (1970), the
court stated, " 'Retrospective' is the antonym of 'prospective.' A prospective law is defined
. . .as: 'One applicable only to cases which shall arise after its enactment.' " Id at 176
n.1, 177 N.W.2d at 397 n.l (citation omitted). Professor Friedmann defined prospective
overruling as the "overruling of a well-established precedent limited to future situations,
and excluding application to situations which have arisen before the decision and are
therefore presumed to be governed by reliance on the overruled principle." Friedmann,
supra note 3, at 602.
Prospective overruling does not require application of the new rule to the cause of
action before the court; however, the practice of applying the new rule to the parties
litigating the issue is pervasive. See notes 23-24 rn/ta. Therefore, for the purposes of this
Note, prospective overruling will mean that the new rule of law is applied to the case
before the court and to causes of action arising after the date of decision.
6. See note 5 supra and accompanying text; notes 22-34 i)n/a and accompanying text.
7. See note 4 supra and accompanying text; notes 12-21 in/fa and accompanying text.
8. See notes 12-39 trn/a and accompanying text.
9. See notes 40-72 i'n/a and accompanying text.
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overruling in tort decisions will be compared and contrasted with the
approach of other jurisdictions.10 Finally, this Note will analyze the
Minnesota approach in light of the relevant policy considerations underlying prospective and retroactive overruling."
II.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING APPLICATION OF NEW RULES
OF LAW

A.

Retroactive Application

Retroactive overruling has its origins in the doctrine, formulated by
Blackstone, that courts discover the law.12 Under this doctrine, the overruled precedent, being an erroneous interpretation of the law, is treated
as if it never existed.13 Therefore, the new rule of law is applied to all
cases that are decided after the date of the overruling decision.' 4 Even
though courts no longer subscribe to the doctrine that the law is discovered,- 5 retroactive overruling remains the prevailing view.16
The United States Supreme Court has held that state courts are free to
apply a decision retroactively or prospectively without offending the
Constitution.'

7

In the context of this freedom, a majority ofjurisdictions

10. See notes 73-91 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 73-99 infra and accompanying text.
12. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69-70
(1765); Rogers, s.upra note 3, at 40-42; Traynor, supra note 3, at 535-36; Note, supra note 3,
at 79-80. In Hoven v. McCarthy Bros., 163 Minn, 339, 204 N.W. 29 (1925), the Minnesota court acknowledged the Blackstone doctrine. The court stated that "the overruled
decision is regarded in law as never having been the law, but the law as given in the later
case is regarded as having been the law, even at the date of the erroneous decision." Id at
431, 204 N.W. at 30. The Hoven court avoided the practical problems of retrial that pure
retroactive overruling would create by limiting its decision to cases that had not been
finally adjudicated. See id
13. See note 12 supra.
14. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
15. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("We
should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law
and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights."); Rogers,
supra note 3, at 35, 42; Traynor, supra note 3, at 535-36; Note, supra note 3, at 80.
16. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Judicial opinions have had retroactive operation for near a thousand years.");
Tate v. Town & Country Lanes, Inc., 79 Mich. App. 89, 91, 261 N.W.2d 220, 221-22
(1978); Olson v. Augsberger, 18 Wis. 2d 197, 199, 118 N.W.2d 194, 196 (1962); Peck, The
Role of the Courtsand Legislaturesin the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REv. 265, 300 (1963);
note 4 supra; notes 18, 29 infa.
17. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965) ("the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect'); Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co.,
287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932) ("A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may
make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation
backward"). The Minnesota Supreme Court has cited these propositions with approval.
See State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898, 907 n.15 (Minn. 1977) (citing Linkletter), notedin 5
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 251 (1979); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 173 n.6, 199
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hold that the overruling of a judicial decision is given retroactive effect. 18
There are two modern justifications for this approach. First, changes in
the law do not occur abruptly. Normally, these changes are painstakingly slow.t 9 Accordingly, when a court declares a new rule of law it is
often a reflection of values and beliefs that have become so pervasive in
the law or society that it may be said that the court is merely recognizing
preexisting law.20 Second, when a court determines that a rule of law no
longer serves the ends of justice, it does not make sense to continue to
apply the old rule of law after the date of the decision. 2 1 Therefore,
when a new rule of law is applied retroactively to all cases decided after
the overruling decision, the ends of justice are properly served.
N.W.2d 639, 647 n.6 (1972) (citing Sunburst); Schultz v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 286 Minn.
231, 236, 175 N.W.2d 177, 180 (1970) (citing Sunburst).
18. See Peck, supra note 16, at 300; Note, supra note 3, at 80. Minnesota at one time
conformed to the majority rule giving retroactive effect to overruled decisions. See, e.g.,
Canton v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (D. Minn. 1967), aj'd,388 F.2d 985 (8th
Cir. 1968) ('judicial decisions usually operate retroactively unless the Court specifically
determines to give them only prospective application"); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347,
113 N.W.2d 355, a'd in part, vacated in part on rehearing, 261 Minn. 361, 113 N.W.2d 364
(1962) (per curiam) (prospective overruling not applied to negligence actions because parties do not plan their conduct in advance to conform with existing law); Hoven v. McCarthy Bros. Co., 163 Minn. 339, 341, 204 N.W. 29, 30 (1925) ("It is the law that a decision of
a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation"). Recently, however, the Minnesota court has not observed the majority rule. See
notes 44-72 bna and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 14 (1928); Henderson, supra note 1, at 477; Pedrick, supra note 1,at 783-84; Thayer,Jui ial Legislation." Its
Legitimate Function in the Development of the Common Law, 5 HARv. L. REV. 172, 188-90
(1891).
20. Several commentators have modified the Blackstone doctrine, see note 12 supra
and accompanying text, and have discarded its mystical trappings. Instead of asserting
that courts discover the law as if a body of law existed in and of itself, these commentators
have taken the position that judge-made law merely reflects the values and beliefs of society. One author stated:
[I1ndeed, even when "new law" must be made, it is often in fact a matter of the
court articulating particular clear implications of values so generally shared in
society that the process might well be characterized as declaring a preexisting
law. Moreover, this must inevitably be so. For it is the basic role of the courts to
decide disputes after they have arisen. That function requires that judicial decisions operate (at least ordinarily) with retroactive effect. In turn, unless those
decisions (at least ordinarily) reflect preexisting rules or values, such retroactivity
would be intolerable.
Mishkin, supra note 3, at 60 (footnotes omitted). Other authorities have agreed with Professor Mishkin that the law reflects society's values and beliefs. See, e.g., Green, The Thrust
of Tort Law, PartP The Influence ofEnvronment, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 1,2 (1969); Henderson,
supra note 1,at 483.
21. See Berghammer v. Smith, 185 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1971), in which the Iowa
Supreme Court, applying Minnesota law, held that a Minnesota decision prospectively
overruling the bar to a wife's cause of action for loss of consortium would be applied to a
cause of action that arose prior to the date of the Minnesota decision in order to serve the
ends of justice. See id at 232-33. For a further discussion of Berghammer, see note 82 in/fa.
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Prospective Application

The basic premise underlying prospective overruling is that the parties
who have justifiably relied on the state of the law should not be penalized when a court decides to change that rule of law. 2 2 Typically, however, the new rule of law is applied to the case before the court. This
procedure is followed because public policy considerations encourage litigants to challenge obsolete legal doctrines 23 and because application of
the new rule of law to the parties before the court eliminates the possibil2
ity that the application of the new rule will be deemed dictum. 4
When the overruling decision involves contract law, property law, or
criminal law, an exception to retroactive overruling is generally recognized and the decision is prospectively applied. 25 In these areas, reliance
on prior law can easily be demonstrated because conduct is affected by
the state of the law. For example, when parties make contracts or transfer property, the legal requirements for executing the agreements and the
duties and obligations as they exist at the time of the transaction are an
integral part of the bargaining process. Because the law as it exists is
22. See, e.g., Schultz v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 286 Minn. 231, 235-36, 175 N.W.2d 177,
180 (1970); Hollinshead v. Von Glahn, 4 Minn. 190 (Gil. 131) (1860). Holinsheadinvolved
the assessment of damages for a breach of a money contract. The court stated, "[w]hen
the highest court in the state has decided a point, parties have a right to act upon it as
settled, and we will not allow any injury to result to suitors in consequence of such dependence, when we feel bound in duty to change our decisions." Id at 191 (Gil. at 132). See
generaly Rogers, supra note 3, at 51-55; Traynor, supra note 3, at 543-47.
23. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1244, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 876 (1975). See generally Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 463, 490-91 (1962); Mishkin, supra note 3, at 60-62; Rogers, supra note 3, at 49.
But see Traynor, supra note 3, at 546 (criticizing application of the new rule of law to the
parties before the court as an incentive to challenge outmoded legal doctrines).
24. See generally Keeton, supra note 23, at 491 n.74; Rogers, supra note 3, at 46-49
(discussing Naftalin v. King, 257 Minn. 498, 102 N.W.2d 301 (1960) and Naftalin v. King,
252 Minn. 381, 90 N.W.2d 185 (1958)); Note, sra note 3, at 79. For authority criticizing
the argument that the new rule of law is dictum if it is not applied to the parties before the
court, see Currier, supra note 3, at 216-27; Snyder, supra note 3, at 151; Traynor, supra note
3, at 560.
25. See, e.g., Dehco, Inc. v. State Highway Dep't, 147 Ga. App. 476, 477, 249 S.E.2d
282, 283 (1978); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 28, 163
N.E.2d 89, 97 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); Lasher v. Commonwealth, 418
S.W.2d 416, 419 (Ky. 1967); Schultz v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 286 Minn. 231, 236, 175
N.W.2d 177, 180 (1970) (quoting Molitor); Eicher v. Jones, 285 Minn. 409, 413, 173
N.W.2d 427, 430 (1970); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 361, 113 N.W.2d 364, afg in part,
vacating in part on rehearing, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1962) (per curiam); Hoven v.
McCarthy Bros. Co., 163 Minn. 339, 341-42, 204 N.W. 29, 30 (1925); Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 575, 157 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1968); Keeton, supra note 23,
at 490. Seegenerally Levy, supra note 3, at 131, 133-34; Snyder, supra note 3, at 131, 133-34;
Traynor, supra note 3, at 543-44, 549-59; von Moschzisker, Stare Decsis in Courts of Last
Resort, 37 HARV. L. REv. 409, 425 (1924).
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incorporated into every contract, 26 the rights of parties that have entered
into an agreement assuming that the existing law will govern the transaction should be determined by that law when disputes arise under the
contract.
In criminal law, the policy underlying prospective overruling also is
rooted in the reliance principle.2 7 Public policy dictates that a person
should be able to rely on the law as it exists without fear of subsequent
28
sanction.
C

Retroactive and Prospective Overruling in PersonalInjury Decisions

When substantive tort doctrines are overruled, the general rule is to
give retroactive effect to those decisions.29 As with the areas of criminal,
26. See 6A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1374-75 (1951); 14 S.
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

WILLISTON, TREATISE

§§ 6628-29 (3d ed. 1972).

27. The public policy underlying prospective overruling in criminal cases is identical
to the policy underlying the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. See
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192 (1977) ("an unforeseeable judicial enlargement
of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex postfacto law such
as Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids.") (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S.
347, 353 (1964)). See generall' L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25-26, 474-82
(1978). The Constitution prohibits the enactment of ex post facto laws by Congress or by
any state. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Even though the prohibition applies only to legislative acts and not to judicial decisions, judicial attempts retroactively to expand criminal
sanctions have been held to violate due process. See L. TRIBE, supra, at 477-78; Traynor,
supra note 3, at 548.
28. Seegeneral'y L. TRIBE, supra note 27, at 477-84.
29. See, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1050 (Alaska 1975) (abolition of last clear
chance doctrine will apply to causes of action that arose prior to decision but have not
gone to trial); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829-30, 532 P.2d 1226, 1244, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858,876 (1975) (abrogation of contributory negligence and adoption of comparative
negligence will have limited retroactive application); Linder v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc.,
342 So. 2d 474, 476 (Fla. 1977) (doctrine of strict liability announced in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976), to be retroactive); Ryter v. Brennan, 291 So. 2d
55, 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (newly created rule that a wife may bring an action for
loss of consortium will be retroactively applied); Winnett v. Winnett, 9 I1. App. 3d 644,
645, 292 N.E.2d 524, 525 (1973) (doctrine of strict liability announced in Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 32 Il1. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), to be retroactive), rev'don other grounds, 57
Ill. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974); Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970)
(retroactively overruled rule against wife's cause of action for loss of consortium; "there is
no good reason for a new rule of tort law not to be applied retrospectively") (emphasis in
original); Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d 218, 223 (1971) (recognition of action for prenatal injuries held retroactive); Roth v. Roth, 571 S.W.2d 659, 672
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (abandonment of "active-passive" negligence standard to have retroactive effect as an overruling decision dealing with substantive principles of law);
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532
(1969) (decision abolishing defense of intrafamily tort immunity for nonwillful torts will
be applied retroactively); Rice v. Argento, 59 A.D.2d 1051, 1051, 399 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810
(1977) (trilogy of New York Court of Appeals cases imposing the duty of reasonable care
on a landowner regardless of the status of the entrant held retroactive); Cole v. Woods, 548
S.W.2d 640, 651 (Tenn. 1977) (retroactive abolition of doctrine that imputes contributory
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contract, and property law,30 when considering tort law, a majority of
courts recognize an exception to the general rule requiring retroactive
31
overruling when there has been a clear showing of justifiable reliance.
These jurisdictions, however, are loath to apply the exception because
principles of tort liability have little, if any, impact on a defendant's conduct. 32 Therefore, the reliance principle generally cannot be used tojus33
tify prospective overruling in the tort area.
When the abolition of a tort immunity is involved, however, a majority of courts recognize an exception and apply the overruling decision
prospectively.34 Again, the reliance principle justifies the different treatnegligence in automobile accident cases); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 114 N.W.2d
105, 114 (1962) (decision abolished doctrine of gross negligence and was applied retrospectively); Peck, supra note 16, at 300.
In the above cited cases, the new rule of law was generally applied to the case before
the court and to all cases pending or coming to trial or retrial after the date of the decision. The only restriction on this retroactive effect is that cases in the process of appeal
must not be based solely on the overruling decision. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 743-44, 575 P.2d 1162, 1173, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 391 (1978); Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 829, 532 P.2d at 1244, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
30. See notes 25-28 supra.
31. See Keeton, supra note 23, at 490; Rogers, supra note 3, at 52-55, 70; Traynor, supra
note 3, at 543; Note, supra note 3, at 82; note 34 in/ra and accompanying text.
32. Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 361, 113 N.W.2d 364 (per curiam) (prospective
application denied when wrongful death statute was construed to include loss of society
and companionship in addition to pecuniary loss), ajg in part, vacating in part on rehearing,
261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1962); Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22,
26, 141 A.2d 273, 275 (1958) (abolition of charitable immunity applied retroactively because there was no justifiable reliance on the immunity; court stated that "reliance has
very little place anywhere in the field of torts"); see Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38
Wis. 2d 571, 578, 157 N.W.2d 595, 598 (1968) ("The degree of reliance a tortfeasor might
have placed on a wife's inability to recover consortium damages would be insignificant if
existent. Certainly the tort was not committed with this in mind and the degree to which
it may have influenced the decision whether or not to purchase liability insurance would
be less than minimal."); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 114 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1962)
("The argument is made that the doctrine of gross negligence is needed to deter such
conduct, but it is doubtful that potential tortfeasors were aware of the rule and, if they
were, whether they reflected upon it or their conduct was deterred by it."). See general/y
Keeton, supra note 23, at 490; Peck, supra note 16, at 300.
33. See Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 576-77, 156 N.W.2d 595,
597-98 (1968) (party seeking prospective treatment must establish a compelling judicial
reason) (quoting Dupuis v. General Cas. Co., 36 Wis. 2d 42, 45, 152 N.W.2d 884, 885
(1967)); Keeton, supra note 23, at 490; Peck, supra note 16, at 300; Traynor, supra note 3, at
546; note 32 supra and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Winnett v. Winnett, 9 11. App. 3d 644, 645, 292 N.E.2d 524, 525 (1973)
(distinguishing the overruling of an immunity from the overruling of other substantive
tort principles, rejecting prospective overruling in the former circumstance), reu'd on other
grounds, 57 I11.2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hosp., 33 I11.2d 326, 337-38, 211 N.E.2d 253, 260 (1965) (abolition of charitable immunity), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 28, 105
N.W.2d 1, 14-15 (1960) (abolition of charitable immunity); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419,
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ment of immunity cases. Even though it is generally accepted that parties do not commit torts merely because their actions are immune from
suit, 3 5 most jurisdictions recognize that a party may have refrained from

purchasing insurance or may have purchased deficient amounts or kinds
of insurance in reliance upon the immunity.36 The prospective abroga-

tion of a tort immunity gives a party the opportunity to purchase or
adjust liability insurance37 An additional justification for the immunity
exception to retroactive overruling is the argument of insurance companies that their rates are affected greatly by changes in the law38 and that
retroactive overruling would deny them the opportunity to make a
433, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (1966) (abolition of parent-child immunity); Abernathy v. Sisters
of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599, 606 (Mo. 1969) (abolition of charitable immunity); cf
Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962)
(abolition of government immunity to be applied only after next session of legislature);
Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 657, 121 N.W.2d 249, 254-55
(1963) (abolition of religious institution immunity to be applied two months after date of
decision and to instant case). But see Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359
P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (abolition of governmental immunity to be applied to
instant case as well as to future cases); Haney v. Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 742 (Ky.
1964) (abolition of governmental immunity given retroactive effect); Myers v. Genessee
County Auditor, 375 Mich. 1, 133 N.W.2d 190 (1965) (abolition of municipal immunity to
be applied to instant case, and to all pending and future cases); Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 26, 141 A.2d 273, 275 (1958) (abolition of charitable immunity
given retroactive effect). See generaly Keeton, supra note 23, at 490; Littlefield, Stare Decisis,
Prospecte Overruling andjudicialLegislation in the Context of Sovereign Immunity, 9 ST. Louis
L.J. 56, 76-77 (1964); Rogers, supra note 3, at 70-71; Traynor, supra note 3, at 547; Note,
Prospective-Retroactive Overruling." Remanding Pending Legislative Determination, 58 B.U.L. REv.
818, 826-27 (1978); 35 Mo. L. REv. 418 (1970) (charitable immunity).
35. See, e.g., Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 26, 141 A.2d 273, 275
(1958) (abolition of charitable immunity; "reliance has very little place anywhere in the
field of torts"); Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 578, 157 N.W.2d 595,
598 (1968) (decision recognizing wife's cause of action for loss of consortium held to have
retroactive effect); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 114 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1962) (abolition of gross negligence doctrine; "it is doubtful that potential tortfeasors were aware of
the rule, and, if they were, whether they reflected upon it or their conduct was deterred by
it").

36. See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d I1, 29,
163 N.E.2d 89, 98 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361
Mich. 1, 28, 105 N.W.2d 1, 14-15 (1960); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 431, 142 N.W.2d
66, 74 (1966); Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 578, 157 N.W.2d 595,
598 (1968). But see Franco v. Davis, 117 N.J. Super. 496, 271 A.2d 735 (1970).
37. Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 431, 142 N.W.2d 66, 74 (1966); see Keeton, supra
note 3, at 490.
38. See Keeton, supra note 23, at 492-93. Some legal scholars maintain that changes
in substantive tort doctrines have little if iny impact on rating practices. See Keeton,
supra, at 493; Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignifcance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 580-81 (1961); Peck, supra note 16, at 300-01.
Furthermore, the entire reliance argument in immunity cases has been attacked by
legal scholars and courts. See Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 NJ. 22, 26, 141
A.2d 273, 274-75 (1958); Keeton, supra, at 490-93; Peck, supra note 16, at 300-01.
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proper investigation with full knowledge of the extent of liability.39
In summary, the general rule is to give retroactive application to decisions that overrule substantive tort doctrines. An exception exists, however, in the immunity cases in which justifiable reliance may exist.
III.

THE MINNESOTA APPROACH

Minnesota has consistently followed the general rule of retroactive
overruling,40 recognizing an exception to the rule in the areas of criminal,41 contract, and property law when there has been a clear showing of
justifiable reliance on prior law or vested rights. 4 2 In addition, the Minnesota court has recognized an exception to retroactive overruling when
an immunity has been abolished. 43 In the area of tort law, however,
39. See Balts v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 431, 142 N.W.2d 66, 74 (1966).
40. See notes 48-57 infra and accompanying text.
41. In 'the area of criminal law, the Minnesota court uses a balancing formula to
determine whether an overruling decision is to be given prospective or retroactive application. See State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898, 907 n. 15 (Minn. 1977) (applying prospectively a
procedure whereby multiple defendants are clearly informed of the inherent problems in
dual representation of defendants by a single attorney). This balancing approach was
developed by and adopted from the United States Supreme Court. See Adams v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 278, 280 (1972); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). The factors that are
considered in making the determination include the purpose to be served by the new
standards, the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and
the effect upon the administration ofjustice. See State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d at 907 n.15
(Minn. 1977).
42. See Hoven v. McCarthy Bros. Co., 163 Minn. 339, 342, 204 N.W. 29, 30 (1925)
("contracts may not be invalidated nor vested rights acquired under them impaired by a
change of construction made by a subsequent decision."); Lovejoy v. Stewart, 23 Minn.
94, 101 (1876); note 22 supra. In Lovejoy, which involved a controversy over a contract for
the sale of land, the court refused to apply the principle actus curiaenemznem gravabil (an act
of the court shall prejudice no man), because a decision holding that U.S. treasury notes
were not legal tender was rendered after the act in question. 23 Minn. at 101.
43. See Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 132, 235 N.W.2d 597, 603 (1975) (abrogation of state tort immunity to be applied after August 1, 1976, or until the State Legislature acts); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 371-73, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969)
(abrogation of interspousal tort immunity to be applied to the instant case and to all
causes of action arising after date of decision); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 443, 161
N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968) (abrogation of child-parent immunity in negligence cases to be
applied to the instant case and to causes of action arising after the date of decision); BaIts
v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 434, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (1966) (abrogation of parent-child immunity to be applied to the instant case and to all causes of action arising after date of
decision); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 292, 118 N.W.2d
795, 803 (1962) (abolition of governmental immunity to be applied to tort claims arising
after next legislative session).
A unique and interesting use of the reliance principle in an immunity case occurred
in Eicher v. Jones, 285 Minn. 409, 173 N.W.2d 427 (1970). In Either, a case in which a
minor child sued one of his parents for negligence that caused an automobile accident, the
court considered whether to apply Si/esky to a cause of action that arose before the filing
date of the Silesky decision. See id at 411, 173 N.W.2d at 429. The principles of prospec-
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when the abolition of an immunity is not involved, the Minnesota court
has not applied the principles underlying prospective and retroactive
overruling consistently. 44 As noted previously, the majority of jurisdictions, when overruling a substantive tort doctrine, apply the decision retroactively.45 Minnesota, in contrast, applies the new rule of law
prospectively.46 This anomalous treatment is the result of a series of
cases overruling substantive tort law that apparently failed to apply
Minnesota precedent and failed to address the policies underlying pro47
spective and retroactive overruling.
Minnesota recognized the reliance principle as early as 1860. In Hl/r'ngshead v. Von Glahn,48 the court considered whether a case that had
changed the rule regarding the damages allowable for breach of a money
contract would apply to a contract that specified a different amount
based on the prior rule of law. The Holhngsheadcourt held that when the
highest court in a state has declared what the law is, parties who have
justifiably relied on the former law should not be injured by the new
rule. 49 In Hoven v. McCarthy Bros. ,50 the court stated that overruling decisions are given retroactive effect except when contracts or vested rights
tive overruling require that causes of action arising prior to the overruling decision be
judged under the old rule of law. See notes 5, 23-24 supra. The Etcher court, however,
ruled that the parties would be judged under the new rule of law as declared in Sesky.
Eicher v. Jones, 285 Minn. at 412-13, 173 N.W.2d at 429-30. The Etcher court based its
decision on the reliance principle. Although the plaintiff in Either commenced the action
before the action was commenced in Sl/esky, the parties in EtCher delayed their appeal and
agreed that the decision in Si'esky would be controlling. Id at 412, 173 N.W.2d at 429. In
addition, the court stated that if the parties in Ether had continued their appeal, most
likely it would have been consolidated with Silesky. Id Therefore the EtCher court felt
compelled to apply the new rule of law to a cause of action that arose prior to a decision
that prospectively overruled the old rule of law. See id at 412-13, 173 N.W.2d at 429-30.
The Etcher court cited as its primary justification for its unique approach the reliance of
the parties on the outcome of Stilesky. See id at 412-13, 173 N.W.2d at 429-30. Even
though the decision in Etcher had the same effect as retroactive overruling (applying the
rule in an overruling decision to cases coming to trial after the overruling decision) the
Etcher court made it clear that it still rejected the retroactive overruling of the child-parent
immunity doctrine. Setid at 413, 173 N.W.2d at 430. Since Eitcher no Minnesota case has
presented circumstances that were unusual enough to warrant the Etcher exception to prospective overruling. See Thoen v. Hatton, 287 Minn. 545, 177 N.W.2d 815 (1970) (in suit
by wife for loss of consortium arising out of accident that occurred one year prior to decision allowing wife to recover damages for injury to husband, court found no facts to place
case within Etcher exception); Schultz v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 286 Mijnn. 231, 175 N.W.2d
177 (1970) (in suit by child against mother for injuries arising out of car-train collision
that occurred prior to Silesky, court held no special facts to place it in Etcher exception).
44. See notes 46-91 tnfra and accompanying text.
45. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
46. See notes 58-71 inifa and accompanying text.
47. See notes 58-91 utfia and accompanying text.
48. 4 Minn. 190 (Gil. 131) (1860).
49. Id at 191 (Gil. at 132); see note 22 supra and accompanying text.
50. 163 Minn. 339, 204 N.W. 29 (1925).
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are involved.51 Thirty-seven years later, the general rule set out in Hoven
was affirmed in Fussner v. Andert. 52 Fussner involved a wrongful death
action arising out of an automobile accident. The Minnesota wrongful
death statute was construed to include recovery for loss of society and
companionship in addition to pecuniary loss.53 Defendant's request that
the decision be modified to apply only prospectively was denied.54 The
court stated that prospective overruling would have some merit if the
case before it involved a question of contract or property law in which
the parties had taken action in reliance on existing law.55 The court then
noted that the reliance principle was inapplicable in negligence actions
6
because the existing law has no effect on the conduct of the defendant.5
Based upon the case law ending with Fussner, the Minnesota rule for nonimmunity tort decisions was that an overruling decision was given retroactive operation. This rule was founded on the premise that the law of
57
negligence has little or no effect upon conduct.
The first non-immunity tort decision after Fussner to address the issue
of retroactive overruling was the 1966 decision of Weber v. Slokely- Van
Camp, Inc. 58 In Weber, the court abolished the rule that the negligence of
a servant is imputed to the master so as to bar the master's right to recovery against a negligent third party. 59 The abrogation of the imputed
negligence doctrine, however, was limited to automobile negligence
cases. 6o Because Weber was a tort case that did not involve an immunity,
Fussner should have dictated retroactive overruling. The new rule of law,
however, was applied prospectively.6 1 The Weber court offered no justification for prospective overruling except to state that it would be unfair
to impose liability on defendants who have relied, without notice of a
51. Id at 341-42, 204 N.W. at 30.
52. 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (per curiam), afd inpart, vacated in part on rehearing, 261 Minn. 361, 113 N.W.2d 364 (1962).
53. 261 Minn. at 358-59, 113 N.W.2d at 362-63.
54. Id at 361, 113 N.W.2d at 364.
55. Id
56. Id
57. The Minnesota court applied the principle of Fussner stating that an exception to
retroactive overruling exists when there has been a showing of justifiable reliance or vested
rights in two subsequent immunity cases. See Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 431, 142
N.W.2d 66, 75 (1966); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 292,
118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (1962). Ironically, the court in Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284
Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969) used Spanel and Balts to justify prospective overruling.
See id at 514 n.10, 170 N.W.2d at 870 n.10; notes 63-68, 79-84 infra and accompanying
text.
58. 274 Minn. 482, 491, 144 N.W.2d 540, 545 (1966).
59. Id (stating that the rule was defensible only on the grounds of its antiquity).
60. Id
61. See id ("There may be other situations where the same result should follow, but
we leave those decisions for the future as they come before us.").
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departure, on the imputed negligence doctrine. 62
This apparent abandonment of the Fussner line of cases was perpetuated in Thil v. Modem Erecting Co. 6 3 In Thill, the court discarded the rule
that a wife cannot sue for her own loss of consortium as a result of negligent injury to her husband and remanded the case to district court. 64
Because Thdl, like Weber, was a non-immunity tort case, Fussner should
have mandated retroactive overruling. The holding of the Thill court,
however, was applied prospectively. 65 In a footnote,66 the Thdl court
justified prospective treatment by stating that the limitation on prospective application was dictated by two immunity cases, Spanel v. Mounds
View School District No. 62167 and Balts v. Balts.68
The most significant departure from the Fussner line of cases occurred
in Springrose v. Wi/lmore.69 In Springrose, assumption of the risk in its secondary sense was merged with contributory negligence under the contributory negligence statute. 70 Without any discussion, the Springrose
court held that its decision would be prospective. 7 1 Prospective overruling in Springrose was significant because it led to twenty-one appeals
before the Minnesota Supreme Court under pre-Sprngrose law.72
62. Id
63. 284 Minn. 508, 514 n.10, 170 N.W.2d 870 n.10 (1969) (prospective application
dictated by prior decisions). On remand, the district court entered judgment for the wife
and defendant subsequently appealed. See Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 292 Minn. 80,
193 N.W.2d 298 (1971).
64. See 284 Minn. at 511-14, 170 N.W.2d at 868-70 (overruling Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935), to the extent inconsistent with Thill).
65. Id at 514, 170 N.W.2d at 870.
66. Set Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 514 n. 10, 170 N.W.2d 865, 870
n. 10 (1969); note 57 supra. In the second Thll case, the court again stated that prospective
overruling was dictated by Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279,
118 N.W.2d 795 (1962) and Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966). See
Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 292 Minn. at 82 n.2, 193 N.W.2d at 299 n.2.
67. 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962) (school district not liable for injuries sustained by student as result of alleged negligence under the prospectively overruled doctrine of sovereign tort immunity).
68. 273 Minn. 419, 434, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (1966) (defense of immunity abrogated in
all actions by a parent against a child arising out of torts committed from and after this
date; as to torts already committed by unemancipated child against parent, immunity
shall continue to be given retrospective effect, except only as to the case at hand).
69. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
70. Id at 24-25, 192 N.W.2d at 827.
71. See id. at 26, 192 N.W.2d at 828 ("Our decision is prospective, so that it shall
apply only to causes of action arising from and after the date of this decision, except that it
shall also apply to the case at hand.").
72. See Wegscheider v. Plastics, Inc., No. 49512 (Minn. Feb. 15, 1980); Goblirsch v.
Western Land Roller Co., 310 Minn. 471, 246 N.W.2d 687 (1976); Haessly v. Lotzer, 309
Minn. 498, 245 N.W.2d 841 (1976); Evanson v. Jerowski, 308 Minn. 113, 241 N.W.2d 636
(1976); Konovsky v. Kraus-Anderson, Inc., 306 Minn. 508, 237 N.W.2d 630 (1976); Bakke
v. Rainbow Club, Inc., 306 Minn. 99, 235 N.W.2d 375 (1975); Seidl v. Trollhaugen, Inc.,
305 Minn. 506, 232 N.W.2d 236 (1975); Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn. 288, 232 N.W.2d 818
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The Weber court attempted to justify prospective overruling by stating
that it was necessary to protect defendants who had relied on the imputed negligence doctrine. 73 Because the Weber court did not state
clearly how the defendants could have relied on the imputed negligence
doctrine, it is instructive to examine the possible bases for establishing
justifiable reliance.
First, it could be argued that the defendant relied on the imputed negligence doctrine in committing the tort. If defendant had relied on the
defense in committing the tort, however, the action would not have been
a negligence action but rather an intentional tort. Even if the defendant
had relied on the defense in committing the tort, public policy should not
allow a defendant to use the law to escape liability for an intentional
tort. Second, reliance could have been shown if insurance rates had been
based upon the law or if the defendant had refrained from purchasing
insurance coverage because of the prior rule of law. However, there was
no evidence in Weber that the defendant failed to purchase insurance
because of reliance on prior law. Third, there was no claim that prior
law was a determining factor in setting insurance rates. In any event, the
effect of tort doctrines on rating practices is highly questionable. 74 Finally, the defendant in Weber could have established reliance if he had
75
depended on the imputed negligence doctrine in preparing his defense,
but no such argument was made. 76 Because there was no reasonable ba(1975); Lametti v. Peter Lametti Constr. Co., 305 Minn. 72, 232 N.W.2d 435 (1975); Parr
v.Hamnes, 303 Minn. 333, 228 N.W.2d 234 (1975); Broucke v. Lyon County, 301 Minn.
399, 222 N.W.2d 792 (1974); Milloch v. Getty, 300 Minn. 442, 220 N.W.2d 481 (1974);
Meulners v. Hawkes, 299 Minn. 76, 216 N.W.2d 633 (1974); Erickson v. Sorenson, 297
Minn. 452, 211 N.W.2d 883 (1973); Moteberg v. Johnson, 297 Minn. 28, 210 N.W.2d 27
(1973); Schroeder v. Jesco, Inc., 296 Minn. 447, 209 N.W.2d 414 (1973); Gottskalkson v.
City of Canby, 296 Minn. 212, 202 N.W.2d 871 (1973); Stenzel v. Bach, 295 Minn. 257,
203 N.W.2d 819 (1973); Meyer v. Bushma, 295 Minn. 510, 202 N.W.2d 871 (1972); Fick v.
Wolfinger, 293 Minn. 483, 198 N.W.2d 146 (1972); Renne v. Gustafson, 292 Minn. 218,
194 N.W.2d 267 (1972). In addition, two cases in the Eighth Circuit fell prey to the prospective overruling in Sprngrose and applied pre-Sprthgrose law. See Gilbertson v. Tryco
Mfg. Co., 492 F.2d 958 (8th Cir. 1974); Montes v. Betcher, 480 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1973).
73. Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 274 Minn. 482, 491, 144 N.W.2d 540, 545
(1966) (automobile negligence context).
74. See Keeton, supra note 23, at 492-93; Morris, supra note 38, at 580-81; Peck, supra
note 18, at 300-01.
75. See Traynor, supra note 3, at 546.
76. It is well recognized that principles of liability and defenses are in a constant state
of flux and are subject to change at any time by a court. See, e.g.,
New York Cent. R.R. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917) ("No person has a vested interest in any rule of law
entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit."); Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 126 Minn. 286, 291, 148 N.W. 71, 73 (1914) ("no person has any property
right or vested interest in a rule of law"); Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 75, 246
N.E.2d 725, 731, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 963 (1969) ("there is always a certain amount of un-
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sis for reliance in Weber, prospective overruling was not justified.77
Therefore, the Weber court should have retroactively overruled the imputed negligence doctrine. Unfortunately, the Weber court's failure to
apply Minnesota precedent and the principles underlying retroactive
and prospective overruling resulted in the denial of recovery to two
plaintiffs solely because their causes of action arose prior to the date of
7
the otherwise applicable decision. 8
certainty about the law"). See generally Traynor, Unjftifable Reliance, 42 MINN. L. REv. 11
(1957).
77. Although it could be argued that the court was taking judicial notice of the fact of
reliance, a judicially noticed fact must not be subject to reasonable dispute and, therefore,
the fact must be generally known or capable of accurate and ready determination. See
MINN. R. EVID. 201(b) (even though rules were not effective until 1971, the principles of
judicial notice existed in the common law). Because it is generally accepted that reliance
has no place in tort law, see note 28 supra and accompanying text, it is clear that any
reliance by the defendant in Weber on the previous rule of law was subject to substantial
doubt. Therefore, judicial notice of the fact of reliance would be unfounded. As a result,
prospective overruling was not justified.
78. In Pierson v. Edstrom, 286 Minn. 164, 174 N.W.2d 712 (1970), the plaintiffs wife
pulled up next to plaintiffs car while it was stopped on the shoulder of a freeway. The
defendant subsequently collided with both cars. Since the accident occurred prior to
Weber, the defendant sought to bar the recovery of the husband by imputing the contributory negligence of the wife to the husband. Id at 171, 174 N.W.2d at 716. The Aerson
court held that Weber was limited to the master-servant context and therefore was not
controlling. Id This gave the Pierson court an opportunity to correct the error in Weber.
Unfortunately, the apparent misapplication of retroactivity principles was perpetuated.
The Pierson court held that the abolition of imputed contributory negligence between joint
venturers was to be applied to the case before the court and held the decision would be
given prospective application only to automobile negligence cases. Id There was no discussion of any of the relevant policy considerations in support of the holding.
The ruling in Weber appeared once again in B.F. Griebenow, Inc. v. Anderson, 287
Minn. 174, 177 N.W.2d 395 (1970). The plaintiff corporation brought an action against
defendant for property damage resulting from a collision between an automobile owned
by plaintiff and operated by plaintiffs agent and defendant. The incident occurred prior
to the decision in Weber. The Gnebenow court construed the language of Weber to mean
that the former rule of imputed contributory negligence applied to causes of action arising
after the date of the decision and not to actions coming to trial after the decision but
arising prior to that date. Id at 176, 177 N.W.2d 396-97. Additionally, the Griebenow
court stated that "[olur decisions before and after Weber demonstrate that in the prospective overruling of prior substantive rules of tort law we have uniformly intended the new
rule to apply to causes of action arising from and after the date of the decision." Id at
176-77, 177 N.W.2d at 397. The only exception cited was the situation presented in
Eicher v. Jones, 285 Minn. 409, 173 N.W.2d 427 (1970). See note 43 supra. The Grebenow
court not only failed to consider Fussner or Hoven in its statement, but also did not recognize the exceptional nature of immunity cases. In support of its decision, the Gribenow
court relied on Weber, Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 173 N.W.2d 353
(1969), Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969), Silesky v.
Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968), and Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142
N.W.2d 66 (1966). These cases do not support the proposition asserted by the Gribenow
court. Slesky and Balls are immunity cases that have generally been given special treatment. Peterson held that the comparative negligence statute could be applied retroactively.
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Similarly, the rule denying a wife's cause of action for loss of consortium should have been retroactively overruled in Thill. The Thill court

79
stated that prospective overruling was dictated by Spanel and Balts.

There are several reasons indicating that reliance on Spanel and Ba/ts to
justify prospective overruling was not warranted. Foremost is the fact
that Spanel and Bals were immunity cases that are generally recognized
as an exception to the rule of retroactive overruling.80 Because Thill was
not an immunity case, Spanel and Bals were not the most relevant authority to support prospective overruling. Furthermore, neither Spanel
nor Ba/ls contain language that could be construed to apply to all substantive tort rulings.8t Finally, reliance on Spanel to support the proposition that the decision in Thill should be applied prospectively was not
well founded because the Spanel court refused to apply the doctrine to
the case before it and deferred application until after the next legislative
2
session.8
Irrespective of the apparent misapplication of Spanel and Balls, the
See 285 Minn. at 290, 173 N.W.2d at 358. Additionally, the assertions in Thi'! and Weber
are of questionable validity. See notes 66-79 supra and accompanying text. It appears that
the Griebenow court was applying a catch phrase in its overruling decisions without considering the policy reasons underlying retroactive overruling and the consequences of its ruling.
79. See notes 66-68 supra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 34-39 supra and accompanying text.
81. Subject to any statutory limitations or regulations, the Spanel court overruled the
doctrine of sovereign immunity as a defense with respect to tort claims against school
districts, municipal corporations, and other subdivisions of government on whom immunity has been conferred by judicial decision. The court explicitly did not abolish sovereign
immunity as to the state itself. 264 Minn. at 281, 292-93, 118 N.W.2d at 796, 803.
The Ba/ls court abolished parent-child tort immunity in tort actions brought by a
parent against a child. The court explicitly did not abrogate tort immunity in actions by
a child against a parent or between husband and wife. 273 Minn. at 433-34, 142 N.W.2d
at 75.
82. Se Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. at 281, 292-93, 118
N.W.2d at 796, 803-04.
The Iowa Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the propriety of prospective
overruling as applied in Thll in the case of Berghammer v. Smith, 185 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa
1971). In Berghammer, the plaintiff, a Minnesota resident, was injured when plaintiff's
truck collided with defendant's truck in Iowa. In the subsequent lawsuit, the plaintiff's
wife sued for loss of consortium. The Berghammer court held that Minnesota law governed
the wife's action and therefore, the holding in Thill was to govern. Because the cause of
action in Berghammer arose prior to the date of the decision in Thill, Thu/I required the
application of pre- Thill law and a rejection of the plaintiffs wife's claim. The Berghammer
court, however, refused to apply pre-Thill law and held that the parties in Berghammer
would be judged under post- Thi law. Id. at 232. The Berghammer court stated that because Iowa had recognized a wife's cause of action for loss of consortium since 1965, four
years before the decision in Thill, the defendants could not raise any reliance argument
that the Minnesota court apparently felt existed in Thll. In addition, the Berghammer
court stated that applying pre-Thill law would give life to a principle that the Minnesota
and Iowa courts have repudiated. Id at 228-33.
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Thil court was not jusified in giving prospective operation to its decision. The principle error in the Thill opinion is that the reliance principle generally has no application in tort cases because tort law does not
affect conduct.8 3 Moreover, no assertion of reliance was made in Thill.
As was the case with the Weber court's decision, the Thill court's apparent misapplication of precedent and the failure to use the policies underlying prospective and retroactive overruling resulted in two plaintiffs
being denied recovery solely because of prospective overruling.84
There are four major reasons that prospective overruling was not merited in Springrose. First, the general rule in non-immunity tort cases is
that of retroactive overruling.85 Second, it is well accepted that substantive tort law has little or no effect on conduct. 86 Third, there clearly
could be no reliance by defendants or insurance companies upon such an
esoteric concept as assumption of the risk in its secondary sense. Fourth,
insurance premiums are only slightly, if at all, affected by a change in
tort law.8 7 Therefore, there was no basis for recognizing an exception to
the retroactivity rule in Springrose. As a result of the decision in Springrose, over a score of cases as late as 1980 were tried under a principle of
law that was rejected in 1971.88 Four of these plaintiffs were denied recovery solely because their causes of action arose before the Spr'ngrose
83. See note 32 supra and accompanying text; cf 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 12.4, at 756 (1956) (arguing that the existence of potential tort liability does
affect the conduct of large groups and enterprises who may often be exposed to tort law
suits).
84. One year after Thill, plaintiff in Gray v. General Motors Corp., 434 F.2d 110 (8th
Cir. 1970), was denied recovery for her loss of consortium arising out of an automobile
accident inter a/a because the accident occurred prior to the decision in Thtll. Id at 112.
In 1970, the spectre of Thill once again denied a wife recovery for her loss of consortium solely because the accident occurred prior to the decision in Thill. See Thoen v.
Hatton, 287 Minn. 545, 545-46, 177 N.W.2d 815, 816 (1970). But cf. Ryter v. Brennan,
291 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (newly created cause of action for loss of consortium retroactively applied); Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967)
(because of action for loss of consortium applicable to all future and pending actions,
except for claims by husbands or wives which, prior to date of filing of opinion, have been
effectively barred by settlement, judgment, the statute of limitations, or otherwise); Shepherd v. Consumers Coop. Ass'n, 384 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1964) (wife's action for loss of consortium involves matter of substantive law and therefore operates retroactively);
Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 157 N.W.2d 595 (1968) (cause of
action for loss of consortium retrospectively applied).
85. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 32, 83 supra and accompanying text.
87. See Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 578, 157 N.W.2d 595,
598 (1968) ("The degree to which the premiums charged by insurance companies would
have differed had a wife always been accorded the right to recover consortium damages is
speculative and probably relatively insignificant."); Keeton, supra note 9, at 493; Morris,
supra note 36, at 580-81; Peck, supra note 14, at 300-01; Traynor, supra note 3, at 546.
88. See note 72 supra.
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decision.89

The tragedy of cases like Thill, Weber, and Sprungrose is that deserving
plaintiffs are denied recovery under a rule of law that has been declared
to be erroneous. In addition, the administration of justice is hampered
by the application of a dead rule of law to cases coming to trial years
after the overruling decision. Considering the great activity in the area
of tort reform, 90 a plaintiff's chance of recovery easily could become tangled in a pre- and post-decision situation in which the outcome of the
case would not be determined on the ground of justice but by the date
the injury occurred. It is clear from Thi?, Weber, and Springrose that the
Minnesota court is blindly applying the prospective overruling doctrine
without fully recognizing the consequences of its rulings.91
V.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of public policy and fairness, retroactive overruling is the
most equitable approach in the area of tort law. The arguments supporting this view are clear and numerous. First, it is not necessary to use the
prophylactic doctrine of prospective overruling in the tort area since reli89. See Goblirsch v. Western Land Roller Co., 310 Minn. 471, 477, 246 N.W.2d 687,
691 (1976) (recovery denied for loss of hand because plaintiff assumed risk in operating
corn grinding machine); Bakke v. Rainbow Club, Inc., 306 Minn. 99, 104 n.3, 235 N.W.2d
375, 378 n.3 (1975) (combined trial for wrongful death and dramshop liability; decedent's
assumption of risk barred wrongful death action); Schroeder v. Jesco, Inc., 296 Minn. 447,
449 n. 1, 209 N.W.2d 414, 416 n.l (1973) (electrician denied recovery for damage sustained
while working on construction project on basis of assumption of the risk); Meyer v.
Bushma, 295 Minn. 510, 510 n.2, 202 N.W.2d 871, 872 n.2 (1972) (per curiam) (recovery
denied because plaintiff assumed the risk by walking on snow-covered icy ground on exterior premises of defendant's club).
90. See note I supra.
91. One reason tort law continues to be prospectively overruled in Minnesota may be
because there is no incentive for attorneys to bring the issue before the court. Because the
court makes the decision to overrule prospectively in the overruling case rather than in a
subsequent case in which application of the new rule would be contested by adversaries,
and since the court typically applies the new rule of law in the overruling case, there is no
incentive for attorneys advocating a change in the law to point out the inequities caused
by prospective overruling in tort cases. Similarly, attorneys advocating the status quo
have no reason to raise the retroactivity issue. Therefore, it is understandable that the
Minnesota Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the controversy.
For example, in Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971), the
court stated in one sentence that the decision was prospective. Id at 26, 192 N.W.2d at
828. No other discussion of retroactive or prospective overruling appeared in the decision.
Similarly, in Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969), the
court declared that the old rule was prospectively overruled without any further discussion
except a one sentence footnote citing two immunity cases as authority for prospective
treatment. Id at 514 n.10, 170 N.W.2d at 870 n.10. In Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc.,
274 Minn. 482, 144 N.W.2d 540 (1966), the court's entire discussion of prospective and
retroactive overruling consisted of one sentence that was devoid of citations to any authority. Id at 491, 144 N.W.2d at 545.
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ance on prior law is generally not a viable argument. 9 2 Second, by applying the new law to the case before the court, the policy of providing
incentive for challenging outmoded legal doctrines is served. 9 3 Third,
the fear that the new rule becomes pure dicta if it is not applied to the
case before the court is eliminated. 94 Finally, applying the new rule to
cases still in the judicial process promotes the interests of fairness and
judicial administration.95 By accepting review of cases that reach the
court after a change in the law, the court avoids the cumbersome task of
deciding cases under the old law after the rejection of that law.96 Because of the delays in legal process, discredited rules of law live on for
many years under prospective overruling.97
In this era of massive tort reform, the complications caused by prospective overruling might require courts to consult tables to determine
which rule of law to apply in a given instance. Such an absurd result
would not serve the ends of justice. Justice should not depend upon a
fortuitous event such as the date an injury occurred. Unfortunately, prospective overruling in Minnesota tort reform cases still persists.

98

Until

92. See notes 32, 83 supra and accompanying text.
93. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
94. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829-30, 532 P.2d 1226, 1244, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 876 (1975) (doctrine of contributory negligence abrogated and new rule of
comparative negligence given retroactive application).
96. See notes 21, 78, 84, 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Wegscheider v. Plastics, Inc., No. 49512 (Minn. Feb. 15, 1980) (legal
doctrine rejected in 1971 applied to case arising prior to 1971 but not decided by Minnesota Supreme Court until 1980).
98. See Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 173, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972). In Peterson the court prospectively overruled the rule that a property entrant's status is controlling
when determining the landowner's duty to that person. Id The court held that an entrant's status as licensee or invitee is only one element among many to be considered in
determining a landowner's liability under ordinary standards of negligence. Id In justifying prospective overruling, the court stated, "[allthough the time has come when we must
reexamine our previous decisions, the doctrine of stare decisis restrains us from overruling
our previous holdings with retroactive effect. In the present case, we prospectiveiy eliminate previous restrictions to which we have adhered." Id In a footnote the court stated,
"in fairness to all litigants and trial courts a more equitable solution is to provide prospective application of the new rules effective from and after the date of this decision, except
that they shall apply to the instant matter." Id. at 173 n.6, 199 N.W.2d at 647 r..6. The
Peterson court failed to recognize the effect prospective overruling has on future litigation.
Surely, it is not fair and equitable to future litigants to try their cases under a rule of law
that had been rejected as unfair and inequitable. Furthermore, prospective overruling is
not fair and equitable to trial courts who must constantly be aware of the date of the cause
of action so they may apply all the rejected rules of law to a case that are required.
To date, four cases that have come to trial after Peterson were tried under the prePeterson rule of law merely because the causes of action arose prior to Peterson. Fortunately, in three of the cases the plaintiff's legal status did not interfere with the court's
determination of duty and breach of duty. See Szyplinski v. Midwest Mobile Home Supply Co., 308 Minn. 152, 241 N.W.2d 739 (1974) (plaintiff, held to be licensee, recovered for
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the effects of prospective overruling in tort reform cases are recognized
and eliminated, confusion will continue to plague this area of the law. 99
injuries sustained when coupling on neighbors' flag pole broke); Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841 (1973) (plaintiff, held to be business
invitee, recovered for injuries resulting from tripping on a photo booth doorway riser).
Unfortunately, in one case the use of the plaintiff's legal status as a controlling factor may
have resulted in the plaintiff being denied recovery. See Stapleman v. St. Joseph The
Worker, 295 Minn. 406, 205 N.W.2d 677 (1973) (per curiam). In Stapleman the plaintiff
tripped over a coatrack at a senior citizen's party on premises furnished by defendant
without charge. Both the trial court and the supreme court held that the duty owed to the
plaintiff should be assessed under the law of a licensee. The supreme court, however,
reversing the lower court, held that there was no evidence of any breach of duty owed to
the licensee. Id at 410, 205 N.W.2d at 680. If the Peterson court had retroactively instead
of prospectively overruled the rule that a property entrant's status is controlling, the fact
that the plaintiff was a licensee in Stapleman would have been only a factor in determining
the duty owed to the plaintiff. As a result, the decision in Stapleman may have been different.
99. For example, the so-called products liability crisis has been prompted in part by
uncertainty in judicial decisions extending the law of products liability. The crisis has
been caused by a complex of factors, however, only one of which is uncertainty in the law.
See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT I-1, -20 to -31
(1976).
Several significant Minnesota Supreme Court personal injury decisions did not specify whether the decision was to be applied prospectively or retroactively. See Perkins v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, No. 47876 (Minn. Nov. 9, 1979) (extrahazardous crossing doctrine
abandoned); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977) (strictly liable
manufacturer can get contribution from a negligent cotortfeasor under Minnesota comparative negligence statute); Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977)
(manufacturer obtained indemnity from installer who failed to discover defect in manufacturer's product); Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679
(1977) (third party manufacturer obtained limited contribution from negligent employer
under Minnesota workers' compensation statute).. The general rule dictates retroactive
overruling absent an express judicial declaration to the contrary. See Canton v. United
States, 265 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (D. Minn. 1967); Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38
Wis. 2d 571, 576, 157 N.W.2d 595, 596-98 (1968) (party seeking prospective treatment
must establish a compelling judicial reason); Rogers, supra note 3, at 42, 59. In addition,
Perkis, Busch, Tolbert, and Lamberson are tort cases that do not involve an immunity. For
an analysis of Busch, Tolbert, and Lamberson, see Note, Contributionand Indemnity-An Examination of the Upheaval in Minnesota Tort Loss A/location Concepts, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
109, 145-58 (1979). Therefore, the rules announced in those cases should be applied retroactively. See notes 29-39 supra and accompanying text (Minnesota has prospectively overruled personal injury decisions since 1966).
A recent Minnesota Supreme Court case dramatically illustrates the confusion that
prospective overruling creates. In Wegscheider v. Plastics, Inc., No. 49512 (Minn. Feb. 15,
1980) the plaintiff was injured when he fell from defendant's tanker trailer. Based on the
fact that the accident had taken place prior to the Minnesota court's ruling in Springrose
v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971), the trial court granted the defendant's
request for a jury instruction on asumption of the risk. The jury found the plaintiff to be
10% negligent and the defendant to be 90% negligent. However, the jury also found that
the plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury. Therefore, the trial court found that, based on
pre-Springrose law, the plaintiff's recovery was barred. On appeal the supreme court reversed the trial court holding that the evidence was insufficient to warrant an instruction
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on assumption of the risk. Thus, nine years after assumption of the risk was abrogated, the
Minnesota court was required by its prospective overruling to deal with a doctrine that
had long been declared unjust. Fortunately, the plaintiff was not denied recovery on the
basis of pre-Spr'ngrose law.
Wegscheider also furnishes another example of the confusion generated by prospective
overruling. The court stated that the rule of Busch v. Busch Constr. Co., 262 N.W.2d 377
(1977), holding that contributory negligence does not include the failure to discover a
defect, was properly applied to the Wegscheider facts. Busch was decided in 1977. Sprzhgrose
was decided in 1971. Thus, the Wegsche'der court applied pre-Sprbngroseand post-Busch law
to the same case. The potential for confusion is obvious.
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